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PRIMARY PROCESS EMOTIONS,
IDENTITY, AND CULTURE
The study of culture and psychology has
generated a number of influential theoret-
ical perspectives (e.g., Henrich et al., 2010;
Markus and Kitayama, 2010). Less atten-
tion, however, has been directed at the
psychological basis of cultural experience.
What is it about cultural symbols that
leads humans everywhere to create them?
And, why do certain cultural symbols, be
they religion, guns, food, or music hold
such emotional weight for many of us? A
simple answer could be “Humans can only
survive in groups. We need shared sym-
bols to communicate and cooperate with
each other” This is essentially true, but
here I argue that primary-process emo-
tions identified by the field of affective
neuroscience, further reflected upon in
the context of several developmental the-
ories, can elucidate the emotional nature
of cultural experience. Culture, we shall
see, is important not just because it teaches
the skills needed to survive in a partic-
ular social and physical environment: It
also satisfies a primary emotional need
for security and predictability. I argue
that a primitive attachment to culture
goes beyond cognitive abilities and lan-
guage to the very basis of human emotion
and motivation. Thinking about cultural
symbols in this way helps to under-
stand the strength, and it can be argued,
irrationality, of feelings and behaviors
sometimes associated with them.
HARD-WIRED FOR RELATIONSHIPS
It has become clear that humans are
endowed from birth with cognitive
capacities that enable them to engage
with and learn from others. From early
infancy, children prefer human faces
to other stimuli (Frank et al., 2009);
they show interest in the attentional
objects of others (Hoehl et al., 2008);
and they are highly sensitive to others’
emotional states (Schore, 2003). Overall,
evidence suggests that young children have
innate biases (i.e., genetically based cog-
nitive modules) directing them toward
absorbing certain types of knowledge:
Abilities such as recognizing specific faces,
learning language, understanding motion,
imputing mental states to others, and
grouping people according to categories
develop naturally in humans everywhere
(see Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004, for a
review). From the earliest stages of their
lives, normally developing humans actively
engage with the social world, expressly
seeking out and preferentially learning
from interactions with other humans.
These strong tendencies to seek out other
people and to absorb social information,
are complemented by an, as far as we
know, uniquely human degree of behav-
ioral and cognitive flexibility. Human
groups not only adapt their behaviors
to different environments, but also mold
those environments in many ways to suit
their needs. Cultures can be thought of as
human created “environmental niches”
(Laland et al., 2000) held together by
symbols and practices that are passed
along across generations. In the context
of human development these symbols
and traditions become, over time, an
integral part of how an individual comes
to understand his own existence. As a
child gradually learns to make sense of his
existence in the world, his ideas about who
he is and what purpose his life serves, are
dependent upon his relationship to the
symbols that hold society together.
Evolution has preprogrammed humans
to absorb traditions from their social
groups and thus to benefit from the
collective experiences of their elders.
Much of the pervasiveness of cultural
traditions can be attributed to this:
Once a group of people has figured out
how to survive well enough in a given
environment, younger generations natu-
rally copy the behaviors of those around
them (Quinn, 2003). Cultural traditions
that are successful at producing off-
spring and providing for them, naturally
and automatically, replicate themselves
through the machinery of learning biases.
Such learning tendencies, however, impor-
tant and distinctively human as they are,
do not explain at a deeper level the emo-
tional significance of culture. There is a
power inherent in certain cultural symbols
that transcends simple learning, or even
survival: People at times become more
attached to cultural symbols than to life
itself.
EMOTION AND MOTIVATION
Learning processes and learning biases
explain much about social learning and
cultural transmission, but they do not
fundamentally explain humanmotivation:
They do not explain why humans actu-
ally do anything. If we, to some degree,
accept arguments for modularity, or the
relative isolation within the brain, of spe-
cific cognitive or information process-
ing abilities (e.g., Sperber and Hirschfeld,
2007), it is important to consider what
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drives humans to seek out information
in the first place. In other words, cog-
nitive abilities and motivation should be
thought of as complementary, but sep-
arate, domains. Something must drive
humans to engage with the world and
acquire the information they are so well
equipped to process.
Panksepp’s (2004, 2011) work in the
field of affective neuroscience provides
such a starting point: He has identi-
fied seven “primary process” emotional
systems that have similar physiological
substrates in all mammals: SEEKING,
FEAR, PANIC, CARE, RAGE, LUST, and
PLAY. Each system can be reliably acti-
vated through the stimulation of dis-
tinct sub-cortical brain regions in both
humans and other mammals. Primary
process emotions, Panksepp argues, are
the motivational foundation for appetitive
and self-preservatory behaviors. Primary
emotional systems motivationally shape
engagement with the environment and
thus serve to direct learning processes:
A child will not explore its environment
or actively seek out novel stimuli if it
is experiencing fear or panic. From ear-
liest childhood, basic emotions provide
the motivation for exploring and learning
about the environment or for retreating
to the relative safety of the familiar. As a
simple example, when the SEEKING sys-
tem of a human is activated (related to
the ventral tegmental area and the nucleus
accumbens) he will feel alert and expec-
tant: Having the feeling that something
good is nearby, he actively explores and
seeks out positive, fitness enhancing, expe-
riences such as food, sex, social interaction
etc. On the other hand, if the FEAR system
(based around the amygdala and hypotha-
lamus) is stimulated, people feel intense
anxiety, like they are being chased or their
life is threatened. FEAR thus stimulates
hiding or fleeing, essentially the oppo-
site of SEEKING. Through experience, the
activation of particular emotional systems
become associated with various stimuli—
people, places, objects, etcetera, and a basic
form of symbolism takes root.
BASIC EMOTIONS AND ATTACHMENT
Two of Panksepp’s basic emotions,
CARE and PANIC, are at the core of
what (Bowlby, 1969, 1988) termed the
“attachment behavioral system.” CARE
is the trigger of nurturing behaviors
found in all mammals. PANIC is the sep-
aration anxiety or distress which keeps
young mammals within safe proximity
to their caregivers. Offspring treat the
parent as a kind of “secure base,” mov-
ing closer when threatened or unsure.
Parental CARE-related behaviors comple-
ment the PANIC system by motivating
the parent to respond to various sig-
nals (e.g., cries, anxious behavior) and to
reduce the offspring’s anxiety. The PANIC
system, Panksepp notes, is anatomically
closely related to physical pain circuits.
Thus, there is a strong intrinsic motiva-
tion for humans to keep caregivers close
at hand: Proximity is security, it allevi-
ates an intense anxiety, the emotional
pain of being alone. Over time, a child
learns which aspects of his world are safe,
and desirable; what Panskepp refers to as
“comfort zones.” When in a comfort zone,
the SEEKING or exploratory affect system
is safely activated: The child feels driven to
explore, play, and thus learn more about
his environment. When possible threats
or uncertain stimuli are encountered,
however, the FEAR system is activated,
motivating the child to retreat toward
his secure parental base. The qualitatively
separate emotion of PANIC or anxiety is
triggered by the perceived absence of a
secure base; the child, in essence does not
know where to turn. Even in the absence
of a direct threat, the feelings of anxiety
which are brought on by the absence of
a secure base will tend to preempt the
activation of more “positive” or approach-
related emotions such as SEEKING or
PLAY. The PANIC or anxiety system—in
concert with the corresponding parental
CARE or nurturing system, thus, serve as
base level motivators that keep a child (or
other young mammal) and its caregivers
in close proximity. Bowlby and others
(e.g., Erikson, 1950; Schore, 2003) have
argued that essential characteristics of the
self are forged within the dynamics of
these early relationships as well as in the
cultural nature of later childhood inter-
actions (Miller et al., 1996, 1997; Quinn,
2003; Tobin et al., 2009).
CULTURE AS SECURE BASE
Thus, humans are hard-wired from birth
to seek out safety and security in other
people, and their early intuitive sense of
the world is shaped by the nature of these
associations. Here I argue that this fun-
damental emotional need for security in
human relationships does not disappear as
a child’s conceptions of the world grow
more complex. Instead, what occurs is a
gradual transformation of the nature of
the secure base. As a child becomes more
familiar with his environment, and his
internal models of how the world works
become more elaborate, the symbolic role
of the caregiver as the primary source
of security and safety is gradually sup-
planted by other developmentally relevant
relationships and stimuli. Developmental
psychologists (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Damon
and Hart, 1988) point to clear shifts in
the focus of children’s attention as well as
their conceptualization of the self as they
progress from infancy through childhood
and adolescence. Through a normal devel-
opmental process, the emotional weight
of the caregiver as the primary source of
security, safety, and self-definition shifts
to various peer groups (see also Harris,
1998) and later to more abstract symbols.
Through childhood and adolescence there
is a gradual expansion of symbolic safety
zones related to greater knowledge of the
world as well as an increased capability
for abstraction. A meaningful sense of per-
sonal continuity develops (Habermas and
Bluck, 2000; McAdams, 2001). A sense of
history and a sense of personal themes;
capabilities, and limitations, as well as likes
and dislikes emerges. A symbolic sense of
identity (e.g., Erikson, 1968) develops. An
individual creates a symbolic representa-
tion of the self-in-relation-to-society that
allows him to thrive in a particular human-
created environmental niche. It allows the
individual to make plans and predictions
about his surroundings and provides an
emotional comfort zone (Minoura, 1992)
in which emotions such as SEEKING,
CARE, and PLAY are free to express
themselves.
The social nature of identity, however,
also relates to an intrinsic dark side which
is often overlooked (e.g., Erikson, 1975).
When there are perceived threats to the
social foundations of a person’s identity;
when people feel like their safety zones
are somehow less secure; when unfamil-
iar practices and ideas knock at one’s
door, it is threatening. Threats to impor-
tant social symbols are threats to the basic
Frontiers in Psychology | Evolutionary Psychology and Neuroscience February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 218 | 2
Bonn Primary emotions, identity and culture
sense of the self: They threaten the sense
of security and safety that is necessary
to interact effectively with the world. No
wonder, then, that emotions like PANIC,
FEAR, and RAGE become easily engaged
at such times, and why history is replete
with horrors committed in the name of
cultural symbols. Thus, I argue here that
the same primary sub-cortical emotional
drive for safety, security, and predictabil-
ity underlies both adults’ adhesion to
cultural symbols and childhood attach-
ment behaviors. Culture is the secure base
from which enculturated individuals can
explore comfortably. This idea is rem-
iniscent of Terror Management Theory
(TMT; Pyszczynski et al., 1999) which
has been well supported empirically over
the years. A critical distinction here is
that TMT conceptualizes cultural iden-
tification as a defense against a cogni-
tive, or conscious, fear of death. If we
consider human behavior from the level
of basic emotions, loyalty to groups and
their symbols does not require abstract
knowledge of impending death. All it
requires is feelings. . . Emotions motivate
us to stay close to trusted others: We
feel safe and secure when we are sym-
bolically in the presence of trusted others
and their representations. We feel anxious,
angry, and hateful when that presence is
threatened.
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